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Abstract 
 
Using data on international banks’ ratings we find that banks with a greater 
capitalisation, larger assets, and a higher return on assets have higher bank ratings. 
Further, the more a bank’s liquidity increased in the past the greater is its rating, the 
larger is the ratio of its operating expenses to total operating income the lower is its 
rating and the more recent is the date that the rating is made the lower is the rating of 
the bank. There is also a strong country effect on bank ratings such that banks from 
certain countries have systematically higher ratings than others. The addition of this 
variable substantially raises the model’s accuracy at predicting a bank’s rating which is 
arguably the major challenge of modelling ratings. The inclusion and modelling of 
country-effects represents a notable innovation of this study.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Ratings of banks and companies conducted by External Credit Assessment Institutions 
(ECAIs) may be seen as instruments that provide investors with prima facie information 
about the financial position of the subject in question and on the price of credit risk.  
 
The role of ECAIs has increased since the introduction of the New Basel Capital Accord 
(NBCA). Banks have to fully rely on internal or external ratings. Banks applying a 
standardised approach are offered two options for calculating capital adequacy 
requirements. The first option requires that all banks will be assigned a risk weight one 
category less favourable than that assigned to claims on the sovereign of that country. 
This suggests a direct link between bank ratings and the country in which a bank is 
based. We investigate this link in our empirical modelling of bank ratings. The second 
option requires that banks use the external credit assessment of the bank itself.4  
 
However, the role of ECAIs has been frequently questioned, see for example, Altman 
and Saunders (2001), Altman et al. (2002) and Bliss (2002). One of the frequent 
arguments employed against external ratings is the fact that there is no explicit 
guarantee that external rating agencies can assess credit risk better than banks 
themselves. For example, Altman and Saunders (2001) argue that agency ratings could 
provide misleading information since the analysis is backward looking rather than 
forward looking. In addition, low transparency of ratings assignments contributes to a 
critical view as well. In other words, ECAICs do not have and cannot have superior 
                                                 
4 There is much disagreement about this concept. See, for example, Altman et al. (2002). A frequent 
argument against this approach is the fact that ECAIs are not regulated and this raises questions about 
their competence including a possible conflict of interests. Other problems can be seen as the failure of 
most ECAIs to predict financial crises in Asia in the late 1990s and even the recent subprime crises in 
USA and elsewhere. 
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information than market participants about uncertainty and about the degree of 
insolvency (illiquidity). 
 
A prediction of financial soundness of banks, corporations and sovereign nations has 
been of central importance for analysts, regulators and policy makers. There are 
numerous empirical studies focusing on predicting either the failure of firms or ratings 
classifications. The first research studies trying to predict firms’ failures were published 
by Beaver (1966), who used a univariate model. Altman’s paper (1968) instigated 
research activities in this niche of corporate finance by applying discriminant analysis as 
a predictor of firms’ bankruptcy. Altman (1977) using ZETA score models initiated a 
new generation of computer based models. These models have employed different 
estimation techniques and more advanced statistical and econometric software. Most of 
the current classification models use logit (probit) models or neural networks, see for 
example, Ohlson (1980) and Altman et al. (1998). 
 
Research focusing on the prediction of bank failures by applying Early Warning 
Systems (EWS) has also been extensively published, see, for example, Mayer and Pifer 
(1970). The series of bank failures in the USA and elsewhere in the 1990s facilitated the 
estimation and exploration of these classification techniques. A large number of studies 
have been published and Altman and Saunders (1998) provide a survey of such 
research. Kolari et al (2002) summarise studies that have been focused on classification 
methods and have contributed to research in this field by introducing the trait 
recognition approach as an EWS method. 
Another strand of empirical research is focused on ratings prediction models (Matousek, 
1995). Ratings are ordinal measures that should not only reflect the current financial 
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position of sovereign nations, firms, banks, etc. but also provide information about their 
future financial positions. Nevertheless, the main challenge in modelling ratings is to 
increase the probability of correct classifications. This strand of research motivates and 
guides our use of financial ratios as determinants of ratings in general and banks ratings 
in particular. In other words, we consider whether financial ratios are important in 
determining a given rating grade. In addition, we introduce a country indicator variable 
to capture country specific effects and, anticipating our results, demonstrate that it 
substantially enhances the predictive accuracy of our models. 
 
The objective of our paper is to analyse the determinants of individual bank ratings 
conducted by Fitch Ratings (FR). That is, we first consider whether (and which of) the 
key financial ratios of banks reflect individual ratings (that is, according to FR, a key 
component for long and short term rating). Secondly, we examine whether bank ratings 
are systematically determined by the timing of the rating. Thirdly, we incorporate an 
indicator variable to capture country-specific variations in ratings under that rationale 
that a bank’s rating is related to the country in which it is based. This methodological 
approach within the context of modelling bank ratings is an additional contribution to 
current research in this field. We also assess the predictive power of our model to 
classify the individual ratings of commercial banks in question. 
 
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the data and the 
methods applied while Section 3 discusses the principal empirical findings. The last 
section concludes.  
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2. Data and Methodology   
 
Fitch Ratings, as one of the largest rating companies for the banking industry around the 
world, releases three types of ratings; legal ratings, long term and short-term (security) 
ratings and individual ratings.  
 
Legal ratings inform about the likelihood that the bank in question will be supported in 
the case of financial difficulties. A legal rating does not indicate how ‘good’ or ‘bad’ the 
bank is. The information that this type of rating contains is whether the bank will be 
supported if it gets into difficulty. This kind of rating has a great impact on a creditor’s 
decision but for the objective of our analysis cannot be employed. Long term and short 
term (security) rating answers the following question: if an investor lends money to a 
bank, how certain is it that it will be repaid on time? These ratings are determined by 
combining individual and legal ratings.  
 
Individual ratings assess the financial position of a bank itself. As stated by FR the 
rating is closely linked with financial performance (financial ratios). The individual 
rating provided by FR is subdivided into five categories according to the performances 
of rated banks.5 Individual rating is the most appropriate method of analysis for the 
objective of this study – which is to consider the determinants of these ratings. 
                                                 
5 The standard classification of the individual rating is A, B, C, D and E. A further graduation among 
these five ratings is used, that is, A/B, B/C, C/D and D/E. The grade A says that the bank is in an 
impeccable financial position with a consistent record of above average performance. The B rating 
defines a bank as having a sound risk profile and without any significant problems. The bank’s 
performance generally has been in line with, or in a better position than, that of its peers. The C rating 
includes banks which have an adequate risk profile but possess one troublesome aspect, giving rise to the 
possibility of risk developing, or which have generally failed to perform in line with their peers. The D 
rating includes banks which are currently under-performing in some notable manner. Their financial 
conditions are likely to be below average and their profitability is poor. These banks have the capability 
of recovering using their own resources, but this is likely to take some time. Finally, the E rating includes 
banks with very serious problems which either require or are likely to require external support. 
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Within this context, the financial ratios of commercial banks have been utilised in 
several ways. They are used as an instrument for cross section analyses of banks and 
also one can apply them to trend analyses. However, the question remains whether or 
not financial ratios (and country) might be used as an indicator of banks’ future 
financial position and, therefore, their individual rating.  
 
Using data on 681 international banks’ ratings between 2000 and 2007 we estimate 
models of the determinants of these ratings, denoted iY .
6 This variable is ordinal and 
has up to nine ranked categories that are assigned integer values from 1 to 9, such that 
lower values indicate a lower rating. The sample size falls as higher-order lagged 
explanatory factors are added to the model and this can cause all banks in a particular 
category to be excluded from the sample. In our application the number of categories is 
either 8 or 9 depending upon the lag specification. The nine rating categories (with 
assigned values in brackets) are: E (1), D/E (2), D (3), C/D (4), C (5), B/C (6), B (7), 
A/B (8), A (9). Figure 1 shows the percentage of banks that are awarded a particular 
rating each year. The five highest categories (A, A/B, B, B/C and C) have larger 
percentages in the first three years (2000, 2001 and 2002) compared to the latter years. 
In contrast, the four lowest categories (C/D, D, D/E and E) have broadly smaller 
percentages in the first three years compared to the latter years. This suggests that 
average bank ratings have declined through time – we assess this possibility in our 
modelling.7  
                                                 
6 The BankScope database has been used to obtain a large sample of commercial banks rated by FR. 
7 Indeed, the average numerical ratings (where E = 1 and A = 9) are 5.00 in 2000, 5.41 in 2001, 5.83 in 
2002, 5.10 in 2003, 5.11 in 2004, 4.31 in 2005, 4.70 in 2006 and 4.64 in 2007. Hence, ratings in the last 
three years are notably lower than in the first three years, confirming the suggestion of a general decline 
in ratings. This would suggest that a time trend could enter with a negative coefficient in the logit/probit 
ratings regressions.  
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We apply ordered choice estimation techniques to the models of this ordinal dependent 
variable because, as is well known, they are the appropriate method to use in this case. 
The ordered dependent variable model assumes the following latent variable form (see 
Greene 2008):  
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where 1λ , 2λ ,…, 8λ  are unknown parameters (limit points) to be estimated with the 
coefficients (the kβ s). Our interest is primarily confined to the general direction of 
correlation between the dependent and independent variables. Therefore, we use the 
sign of kβ  to provide guidance on whether the estimated signs of coefficients concur 
with our a priori expectations. This is instead of looking at the marginal effects which 
indicate the direction of change of the dependent variable (for each value of the 
dependent variable) to a change in ikX . For ordered choice models these marginal 
effects are difficult to interpret.  
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The probit form of this model assumes that the cumulative distribution function 
employed is based upon the standard normal random variable while the logit form 
assumes a logistic distribution. Greene (2008) suggests that probit and logit models 
yield results that are very similar in practice.  
 
The first variable that we include in our model is for the year in which the rating 
was made [ ttime ]. We do not include lagged values of ttime , however, we do 
consider the lagged values of the following seven factors as further potential 
determinants of bank ratings. The ratio of equity to total assets [denoted tEquity ], 
the ratio of liquid assets to total assets [ tLiquidity ] the natural logarithm of total 
assets [ ( )tAssetsln ] and the net interest margin [NI_Margin]. Also considered as 
possible determinants are  ttt OEAOIANOA −=  (where tOIA  is the ratio of 
operating income to total assets and tOEA  is the ratio of operating expenses to 
assets), the ratio of operating expenses to total operating income [ tOEOI ] and the 
return on equity [ tROAE ].
8  
 
                                                 
8 The following three further variables were also considered for inclusion in the model: the ratio of 
operating expenses to assets [ OEA ], the ratio of operating income to assets [ OIA ] and the return on 
assets [ ROAA ]. These were excluded from the model because they would cause a high degree of 
multicollinearity and their effects could be captured in other ways. That is, the effects of OEA  and OIA  
are captured by the variable OEAOIANOA −=  while ROAA  is a close substitute of ROAE  (which it is 
highly correlated with). The highest pairwise simple correlations amongst the explanatory factors involve 
these variables (as follows). The simple correlation coefficients for the specified pairings (calculated 
using a common sample) are: OEA  and OIA , 0.98; ROAA  and NOA , 0.89; OIA  and NOA , 0.84; OEA  
and NOA , 0.72; OIA  and ROAA , 0.71; ROAA  and ROAE , 0.62; ROAA  and OEA , 0.60. The simple 
correlation coefficients of pairs of variables retained in the model are all comfortably below 0.5 (most are 
substantially lower than this) which helps to ensure that the reported regressions do not suffer from severe 
multicollinearity.   
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We do not include current values of these seven variables because they may contain 
information that was unknown at the time the rating was made. For example, if a bank’s 
rating was decided in January 2007 then the value of any explanatory factor measured 
over the whole of 2007 would be unknown when the rating was made. It is worth noting 
that as more lags are included in the model the sample size falls because there is 
information on all variables for fewer banks. Models could not be estimated when the 
lag length exceeded four. Therefore, models are estimated from one up to four lags of 
these variables.  
 
Although rating agencies would always endeavour to incorporate the most recent 
information into their ratings they may also form their views based on the history of a 
bank’s performance. This justifies the consideration of variables lagged more than one 
period in our model. Indeed, the relative importance of recent and older data in rating 
decisions will be indicated by the order of lags that are found to be significant.  
 
Finally, we incorporate an indicator variable to capture country-specific variations in 
ratings. Because there are 90 countries an ordered choice model incorporating 89 
country dummy variables could not be estimated. We therefore proceeded to construct a 
single indicator variable reflecting cross-country differences following a cross-sectional 
variant of the method discussed in Hendry (2001). This indicator variable will capture 
variations in bank ratings that are unaccounted for by the explanatory factors. As 
Hendry (2001) suggests, this should reduce chance correlations between ratings and 
explanatory variables and not remove the effects of explanatory variables that genuinely 
influence ratings.9 Since individual country dummy variables embody clusters of zeros 
                                                 
9 Hendry’s analysis is within the context of modelling inflation using time-series data.  
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that can distort test statistics the combination of these dummies into a single indicator 
index should minimise these effects. The introduction of this country indicator variable 
within the context of modelling bank ratings is a novel feature of this paper. 
  
The indicator variable was constructed as follows. Various regressions including subsets 
of the 90 country dummy variables were used to determine the coefficient and 
significance of each individual country’s dummy variable. Dummies with very similar 
coefficients (where the difference is below half of the coefficient standard error of the 
dummy with the smallest coefficient standard error) were combined and the restriction 
involved tested using a likelihood ratio (LR) test. Only dummies with t-ratios exceeding 
1.5 were considered for entering combined dummies. As the number of variables 
declined this process continued, combining dummies with no more than one coefficient 
standard error difference and using LR tests to validate restrictions. Next, a single 
country indicator variable was constructed using the coefficients on the composite 
dummy variables as weights. This was checked for appropriateness by running a 
regression including the country indicator variable and one particular country’s dummy. 
If the latter was significant this value was incorporated in to the country dummy. After 
all country dummies that were significant had been incorporated this checking step was 
repeated until no individual country dummies were significant at the 5% level when 
included with the indicator variable. The resulting indicator variable (denoted tCountry )  
is specified by equation (3).10  
 
(3) 
                                                 
10 This indicator variable does not include all countries’ dummies because insignificant terms were 
excluded. 78 countries are represented in the indicator variable and 12 are excluded. The excluded 
countries are: Bermuda, Brazil, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Lithuania, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Poland, 
Slovakia and Thailand. These countries, with an implied zero coefficient, are ranked between the group 
San Marino and South Africa and the group Colombia, Costa Rica, Morocco and Peru.   
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Models were then constructed using this country indicator variable and the other 
explanatory factors. A cross-sectional variant of the general-to-specific method was 
employed to produce an initial favoured model.11 Omitted variable tests were then 
conducted by testing each excluded variable’s individual significance (at the 5% level) 
using both z and LR statistics. Any significant variable would be considered for 
inclusion: it would be included if the new model exhibited a lower SBC. This should 
                                                 
11 In this method we first delete all variables with z-statistics below one (or, exceptionally, 0.5 if the z-
statistics are very small for a large number of variables) and apply a Likelihood Ratio, LR, test relative to 
the general model. If the restrictions cannot be rejected we then delete all variables with z-statistics below 
1.5 and then all explanatory factors with z-statistics below 1.96 (applying LR tests relative to the general 
model). If any LR test for joint restrictions is rejected we experiment to find the variable(s) that cause this 
rejection and retain it (them) in the model.  
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ensure that the specification of the model is relatively robust to the model selection 
procedure.  
 
Four sets of models are considered. The first allows a maximum of four lags, the second 
features a maximum of three lags, the third a maximum of two lags and the fourth has 
only one lag of the variables. The sample size ranges from 359 observations for the 
model incorporating four lags to 629 observations for the single lag model. There is a 
trade-off with precision of estimation and the generality of lags considered in the model. 
This makes it difficult to determine which order of lag specification provides superior 
inference. We therefore seek results that are consistent across lag specifications to draw 
inferences. We will also note ambiguities when inconsistencies across specifications 
arise in our empirical application.  
 
4. Empirical Results 
The ordered logit (probit) regression results for the determinants of bank ratings with 
four lags of the explanatory variables are given in Table 1 (Table 3). The logit (probit) 
results for three lags, two lags and one lag specifications are all reported in Table 2 
(Table 4).12 For all four lag specifications we report a general model (including all lags 
of the variables) and at least one parsimonious specification obtained using the general-
to-specific methodology (followed by omitted variables testing).13  
                                                 
12 For the four lag and three lag specifications the omission of data means that one category of the 
dependent variable (the category corresponding to an A rating, 9=iY ) is omitted from the regressions. 
For the other lag specifications all categories of the dependent variable are included.  
13 The only model where an omitted variable was significant was for the logit model with 3 lags where 
2−tROAE  could be added. Hence, the favoured logit and probit models are potentially different for 
models with 3 lags due to 2−tROAE s inclusion in the former and exclusion from the latter. However, 
although 2−tROAE  is significant in the logit model including it, the model excluding 2−tROAE  minimises 
the SBC. Hence, we argue below that the logit model with 3-lags excluding 2−tROAE  should be 
favoured. Therefore, the favoured model for the 3 lag specification is the same for probit and logit forms.  
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In all cases the favoured parsimonious model only includes individually (according to z-
statistics) and jointly (according to a likelihood ratio test, denoted LR statistic) 
significant variables.14 In all cases the restrictions placed on the general model to obtain 
the parsimonious model cannot be rejected according to a likelihood ratio test 
[LR(general→)]. Whilst these generally are exclusion restrictions we also consider 
combining 2−tLiquidity  and 3−tLiquidity  into the difference variable, 
322 −−− −=∆ ttt LiquidityLiquidityLiquidity ,  given that they have approximately equal 
and opposite signs in the specifications with 3 and 4 lags.  
 
The favoured parsimonious model is that which minimises Schwartz’s information 
criterion (SBC). Upon this basis the model favoured in the 4 lag specification includes 
2−∆ tLiquidity  for both probit and logit forms. In the 3 lag specification the favoured 
model includes 2−∆ tLiquidity  and excludes 2−tROAE  for both probit and logit forms 
(although 2−tROAE  is individually significant when included in the logit model, the 
model excluding 2−tROAE  has a lower SBC). There is no choice of parsimonious model 
for the 1 and 2 lag specifications and hence the model specified is favoured. The 
favoured parsimonious models will yield more efficient inference relative to the general 
model and are, therefore, used for inference. Models favoured for inference are 
indicated with bold emphasis. The same models are favoured for the probit and logit 
forms for each lag specification.  
 
                                                 
14 A potential exception is the parsimonious probit specification with 3 lags because 2−tROAE  is 
insignificant. However, this model, with 2−tROAE  included, is not favoured for inference.  
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Considering the favoured parsimonious model for all four lag specifications we find that 
they include the following statistically significant effects with an unambiguous direction 
of correlation. The variable time  has an unambiguous negative effect on bank ratings: 
the more recently the bank’s rating was given the lower the rating will be, ceteris 
paribus. Equity  (capital adequacy) has a positive effect on a bank’s rating: a more 
capitalised bank has a higher rating.15 The natural log of assets also has a positive effect 
on bank ratings: banks with a larger size of assets have a higher rating.16 OEOI  has a 
negative correlation with a bank’s rating.17 The return on assets has a significant and 
positive impact upon ratings.18 All of these effects are unambiguous and consistent with 
prior beliefs.  
 
Country  has a positive coefficient indicating that country specific effects affect a 
bank’s rating: a bank in a less stable/developed/rich economy appears to have a lower 
rating. For example, Canada, Norway and Sweden are in the group of countries with the 
highest country specific rating effects while Bangladesh has the lowest country specific 
rating. This finding confirms our hypothesis that a bank’s country of origin plays an 
important role in assigning individual ratings. Interestingly Ireland (Andorra) is ranked 
in a relatively low (high) position in the country indicator variable.  
 
Liquidity is only significant in models that allow at least three lags. Notably it is both 
the second and third lag of this variable that are significant and their coefficients are of 
                                                 
15 For Equity  only the first lag is significant in the one and two lag specifications, only the third lag is 
significant in the three and four lag specifications. The coefficient is always positive.   
16 Only the first lag of ( )Assetsln  is significant in the favoured parsimonious model for all four lag 
specifications.  
17 The only OEOI  terms that are insignificant are the third and fourth lags of this variable in the four lag 
specification. All significant terms of this variable have a negative sign.  
18 The first lag of ROAE  is significant in models with all lag specifications. The third lag of ROAE  is 
also significant in the three lag specification while its fourth lag is significant in the four lag specification. 
The coefficient on this variable is always positive. 
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approximately equal and opposite sign – this is the case in both the three and four lag 
specifications. Hence, it is the second lag of the change in liquidity, 2−∆ tLiquidity , 
rather than its level, that appears to be important and it has a plausible positive effect 
upon bank ratings. That is, a bank whose liquidity increased two periods ago has a 
higher rating. It seems that the time lag of this effect is important because liquidity was 
not significant in models allowing less than three lags. We note that this effect would 
not have been revealed had we not allowed for sufficient lags in the dynamic 
specification. We believe that allowing for such lags is a strength of our investigation 
relative to analyses that do not consider such dynamics. Indeed, we are not aware of any 
previous studies that have considered any dynamics in their models.  
 
The variable NI_Margin is significant in only the two lag specification and, in this case, 
it is the second lag that is significant. If it is the timing of the lag that is important one 
would not expect NI_Margin to be significant in the one lag specification because it 
does not allow for a second lag. However, its second lag would be expected to be 
significant in the three and four lag specifications too, but it is not. This may be because 
it is dominated by the 2−∆ tLiquidity  variable in these specifications. Thus, it appears 
that the effect of NI_Margin on bank ratings is fragile although, to the extent that there 
is an effect, it is a plausible positive relation.  
 
Finally, NOA  is significant in only the four lag specification with the second lag being 
the significant term. We are cautious of interpreting this as supportive of a significant 
effect upon rating because 2−tNOA  is not significant in the two and three lag 
specifications. Further, in the model where it is significant it has a theoretically 
implausible negative sign. For these two reasons we are inclined to view this apparent 
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correlation as likely being a Type I error (of which there is a 5% chance given our 
chosen significance level).  
 
We also assess the percentage of correct predictions of the favoured parsimonious 
models for each lag specification in Table 5. A prediction is correct when a particular 
observed rating is correctly predicted by the model.  From Table 5 (top section) we see 
that there are between 50.56% and 54.46% (50.83% and 53.42%) correct predictions for 
the favoured logit (probit) models including the country variable.19 The percentage 
correct predictions for two versions of these models excluding the country variable are 
also reported in Table 5 for comparison purposes. The first version specifies exactly the 
same variables in the favoured parsimonious models (reported in Tables 1 – 4) except 
with Country  removed. These estimated models are reported in Table 6 and their 
corresponding percentage correct predictions are given in the middle section of Table 5 
(they are in the range of 28.46% – 32.94% for the logit specification and 27.51% – 
33.41% for the probit form). The second version applies the general-to-specific method 
with all variables except for Country  included in the general model. The estimated 
versions of these models are given in Table 7 and their associated percentage correct 
predictions are reported in the bottom section of Table 5 (these are between 30.84% and 
36.57% for the logit form and 29.41% and 34.07% for the probit specification). The 
percentage correct predictions are substantially greater (by approximately 20 percentage 
points) for the models that incorporate the Country  variable compared to those that do 
not – they also have much larger pseudo 2R s. In addition, the indicator variable is 
highly significant in all favoured parsimonious models, which further demonstrates the 
importance of country effects for predicting international bank ratings. It also indicates 
                                                 
19 These percentage of correct predictions are extremely similar for probit and logit specifications with 
neither form of the model performing better across all lag specifications. 
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that ordered choice models of international bank ratings that exclude such effects will 
omit important information for predicting ratings.  
 
From Table 5 we also note that our models have difficulty in correctly predicting the 
extreme A and E ratings. We believe that this is likely due to the relatively small 
numbers of banks that appear in these categories.  
 
5. Conclusions 
Using data on 681 banks from around the world we examine whether international bank 
ratings are determined by financial ratios, the timing of when the rating was conducted 
by Fitch Ratings and a bank’s country of origin. We find the following clear 
conclusions. Banks with a greater capitalisation ( Equity ), larger assets [ ( )Assetsln ], 
and a higher return on assets ( ROAE ) have higher bank ratings. Further, the greater is a 
bank’s ratio of operating expenses to total operating income (OEOI ) the lower is a 
bank’s rating. We also find a convincing positive effect for the second lag of the change 
in liquidity ( )Liquidity∆ : if liquidity increased two periods ago bank ratings will rise. 
This finding shows that FR’s ratings reflect, at least to some extent, a bank’s liquidity 
position. However, there is only weak and unconvincing evidence that the net interest 
margin (NI_Margin) and net operating income to total assets ( )NOA  are significant 
determinants of a bank’s rating. Overall, we conclude that these are probably not 
important determinants of bank ratings.  
 
Nevertheless, we can conclude that ratings reflect a bank’s financial position (as 
measured by various financial ratios). The estimated results unambiguously support the 
hypothesis that individual ratings assigned by FR rely substantially on fundamental 
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quantitative financial analyses. Of course, we recognise that the views of experts and a 
certain degree of qualitative information are likely employed by FR in establishing 
ratings. However, because this information is not publically available it cannot be 
formally included in our model. Hence, such models will unlikely be able to predict 
ratings with 100% accuracy.  
 
There is strong evidence of country effects on bank ratings such that banks in some 
countries have systematically higher ratings than others. Inclusion of this country effect 
substantially raises the ability of an ordered choice model to accurately predict 
international bank ratings relative to those that exclude them. This suggests that 
international studies trying to find out not only ratings determinants but also to predict 
ratings grades have to include country effects in their models. The presented 
methodological concept of analysing the country effect represents a notable contribution 
of this study. 
 
In addition, the date of the bank’s rating ( time ) has a robust effect on ratings: the more 
recent is the date that the rating is made the lower is the rating of the bank. This result 
supports our working hypothesis that FR and other ECAIs have applied more prudent 
views and policies as a reaction to critiques of their role during the financial turbulence 
of the late 1990s.  
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Table 1: Bank ratings ordered logit regressions (4 lags)  
 
Variables General model Parsimonious models 
Country  2.123 (12.580) 2.080 (13.860) 2.067 (14.269) 
time  –0.298 (–2.112) –0.248 (–2.134) –0.246 (–2.129) 
1−tEquity  –0.002 (–0.044)     
1−tLiquidity  0.272 (0.180)     ( ) 1ln −tAssets  0.815 (2.579) 0.527 (6.886) 0.529 (6.932) 
1arg −tinMNI  –0.015 (–0.101)     
1−tNOA  7.052 (0.725)     
1−tOEOI  –0.515 (–2.028) –0.499 (–3.452) –0.504 (–3.437) 
1−tROAE  0.021 (1.470) 0.032 (3.593) 0.033 (3.565) 
2−tEquity  0.034 (0.645)     
2−tLiquidity  5.601 (2.903) 5.996 (4.148)   ( ) 2ln −tAssets  0.064 (0.090)     
2arg −tinMNI  0.103 (0.689)     
2−tNOA  –30.396  (–1.677) –11.221 (–2.535) –11.333 (–2.570) 
2−tOEOI  –1.416 (–2.164) –1.794 (–3.073) –1.824 (–3.222) 
2−tROAE  0.017 (1.635)     
3−tEquity  0.071 (0.984) 0.086 (6.605) 0.086 (6.730) 
3−tLiquidity  –5.384 (–2.545) –5.767 (–4.527)   ( ) 3ln −tAssets  –0.588 (–0.621)     
3arg −tinMNI  –0.078 (–1.007)     
3−tNOA  5.409 (0.556)     
3−tOEOI  –0.329 (–0.651)     
3−tROAE  0.000 (0.002)     
4−tEquity  –0.005 (–0.114)     
4−tLiquidity  –0.342 (–0.237)     ( ) 4ln −tAssets  0.288 (0.522)     
4arg −tinMNI  0.029 (0.923)     
4−tNOA  –0.818 (–0.224)     
4−tOEOI  –0.016 (–0.126)     
4−tROAE  0.003 (1.011) 0.004 (2.859) 0.004 (2.849) 
2−∆ tLiquidity      5.751 (4.537) 
Limit Points       
λ1 –0.478 (–0.317) –1.182 (–0.931) –1.217 (–0.952) 
λ2 3.211 (2.113) 2.489 (1.917) 2.436 (1.863) 
λ3 5.738 (3.702) 4.986 (3.775) 4.928 (3.702) 
λ4 7.660 (4.836) 6.896 (5.094) 6.840 (5.004) 
λ5 9.954 (6.114) 9.169 (6.567) 9.118 (6.480) 
λ6 11.624 (7.063) 10.821 (7.664) 10.772 (7.584) 
λ7 14.161 (8.270) 13.312 (9.028) 13.259 (8.928) 
Fit Measures       
Pseudo R2  0.383  0.380  0.380  
SBC 3.001  2.702  2.686  
LR statistic 533.432 [0.000] 530.465 [0.000] 530.320 [0.000] 
LR(general→*) NA  5.805 [0.998] 5.986 [0.999] 
Observations 359  360  360  
Table 1 notes. The dependent variable is a bank’s rating which takes a maximum of nine categories that correspond to the integer values in the range of 
1 to 9 and yields up to eight limit points, 8 ,...,2 ,1=iλ  (the intercept is not separately identified from the limit points). Z-statistics (in parentheses) are 
based upon Huber-White standard errors. Also reported are the Pseudo 2R , Schwartz’s information criterion, SBC, and likelihood ratio tests for the 
model’s explanatory power, LR Statistic, and the deletion of variables from the general model to obtain the parsimonious model, LR(general→*). 
Probability values are given in square parentheses. All regressions were estimated using E-Views 6.0 and STATA 10. 
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Table 2: Bank ratings ordered logit regressions (1 – 3 lags)  
 
Variables General Parsimonious General Parsimonious General Parsimonious 
Country  2.194 
(13.70) 
2.171 
(14.544) 
2.142 
(14.725) 
2.147 
(14.582) 
2.117 
(14.755) 
2.127 
(15.706) 
2.140 
(16.732) 
2.158 
(17.210) 
2.124 
(18.583) 
time  –0.166 
(–1.72) 
–0.179 
(–2.188) 
–0.178 
(–2.175) 
–0.175 
(–2.147) 
–0.174 
(–2.133) 
–0.135 
(–2.201) 
–0.128 
(–2.233) 
–0.119 
(–2.789) 
–0.125 
(–2.991) 
1−tEquity  0.053 (1.35) 
    0.031 
(1.091) 
0.048 
(4.327) 
0.052 
(5.682) 
0.054 
(6.795) 
1−tLiquidity  –0.043 (–0.04) 
    –0.934 
(–0.909) 
 0.111 
(0.253) 
 
( ) 1ln −tAssets  0.744 (2.64) 0.482 (7.242) 0.482 (7.239) 0.470 (7.002) 0.470 (7.002) 0.445 (1.848) 0.450 (8.863) 0.460 (9.613) 0.450 (9.383) 
1arg −tinMNI  0.023 (0.23) 
 
 
 
 
  –0.067 
(–0.853) 
 0.031 
(1.051) 
 
1−tNOA  –0.498 (–0.09) 
    3.928 
(0.832) 
 0.403 
(0.170) 
 
1−tOEOI  –0.334 (–2.84) 
–0.314 
(–2.928) 
–0.327 
(–3.004) 
–0.351 
(–3.266) 
–0.364 
(–3.322) 
–0.241 
(–2.187) 
–0.237 
(–2.596) 
–0.355 
(–3.006) 
–0.364 
(–3.212) 
1−tROAE  0.017 (1.89) 
0.015 
(1.996) 
0.016 
(2.122) 
0.020 
(2.881) 
0.021 
(3.001) 
0.013 
(1.379) 
0.013 
(2.061) 
0.022 
(2.778) 
0.025 
(4.123) 
2−tEquity  –0.028 (–0.69) 
    0.018 
(0.666) 
   
2−tLiquidity  4.650 (2.80) 
4.557 
(3.077) 
 4.513 
(3.092) 
 0.870 
(0.839) 
   
( ) 2ln −tAssets  –0.188 (–0.36)     0.005 (0.022)    
2arg −tinMNI  –0.002 (–0.02) 
    0.116 
(1.974) 
0.063 
(2.935) 
  
2−tNOA  –6.033  (–0.78) 
    –7.142  
(–0.973) 
 
 
  
2−tOEOI  –1.082 (–1.85) 
–0.557 
(–2.816) 
–0.563 
(–2.861) 
–0.862 
(–3.956) 
–0.869 
(–3.966) 
–1.293 
(–2.355) 
–0.960 
(–4.328) 
  
2−tROAE  0.009 (1.34) 
0.011 
(2.132) 
0.011 
(2.128) 
  0.003 
(0.326) 
   
3−tEquity  0.044 (1.68) 
0.058 
(4.708) 
0.059 
(4.833) 
0.056 
(4.443) 
0.057 
(4.572) 
    
3−tLiquidity  –3.997 (–2.89) 
–4.003 
(–2.967) 
 –3.946 
(–2.954) 
     
( ) 3ln −tAssets  –0.045 (–0.11)         
3arg −tinMNI  0.012 (0.25) 
        
3−tNOA  –3.615 (–0.67) 
        
3−tOEOI  –0.112 (–1.84) 
–0.126 
(–2.733) 
–0.130 
(–2.832) 
–0.170 
(–3.581) 
–0.174 
(–3.783) 
    
3−tROAE  0.007 (2.43) 
0.005 
(2.823) 
0.005 
(2.801) 
0.003 
(2.360) 
0.003 
(2.300) 
    
2−∆ tLiquidity    3.991 (2.986)  3.938 (2.975)     
Limit Points          
λ1 –0.353 –0.579 –0.678 –1.103 –1.207 –1.197 –0.823 –0.104 –0.193 
λ2 3.422 3.100 2.966 2.560 2.420 2.311 2.692 3.610 3.302 
λ3 6.023 5.699 5.546 5.137 4.977 4.871 5.244 6.057 5.747 
λ4 7.858 7.537 7.385 6.975 6.818 6.652 7.020 7.810 7.504 
λ5 10.098 9.751 9.609 9.188 9.040 8.685 9.042 9.917 9.613 
λ6 11.865 11.477 11.339 10.904 10.761 10.402 10.746 11.731 11.421 
λ7 14.299 13.887 13.740 13.299 13.145 12.870 13.203 14.128 13.809 
λ8      15.615 15.953 16.484 16.159 
Fit Measures          
Pseudo R2  0.387 0.383 0.382 0.381 0.381 0.370 0.369 0.361 0.361 
SBC 2.821 2.679 2.667 2.671 2.659 2.779 2.691 2.705 2.676 
LR statistic 641.176 
[0.000] 
635.086 
[0.000] 
634.014 
[0.000] 
632.253 
[0.000] 
631.129 
[0.000] 
789.309 
[0.000] 
786.214 
[0.000] 
901.181 
[0.000] 
900.094 
[0.000] 
LR(general→*) NA 6.090 
[0.867] 
7.162 
[0.847] 
8.923 
[0.710] 
10.047 
[0.690] 
NA 3.095 
[0.928] 
NA 1.087 
[0.780] 
Observations 425 425 425 425 425 538 538 629 629 
Table 2 notes: see notes to Table 1.  
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Table 3: Bank ratings ordered probit regressions (4 lags)  
 
Variables General model Parsimonious models 
Country  1.154 (12.65) 1.132 (13.37) 1.125 (13.52) 
time  –0.182 (–2.50) –0.156 (–2.43) –0.155 (–2.42) 
1−tEquity  0.004 (0.17)     
1−tLiquidity  0.328 (0.40)     ( ) 1ln −tAssets  0.499 (2.81) 0.292 (7.09) 0.293 (7.11) 
1arg −tinMNI  –0.020 (–0.32)     
1−tNOA  2.109 (0.41)     
1−tOEOI  –0.288 (–1.93) –0.296 (–3.69) –0.300 (–3.73) 
1−tROAE  0.015 (2.00) 0.018 (3.78) 0.019 (3.81) 
2−tEquity  0.013 (0.46)     
2−tLiquidity  3.111 (2.90) 3.367 (4.18)   ( ) 2ln −tAssets  –0.133 (–0.34)     
2arg −tinMNI  0.061 (0.83)     
2−tNOA  –15.979  (–1.61) –6.253 (–2.20) –6.303 (–2.22) 
2−tOEOI  –0.773 (–2.09) –0.992 (–3.05) –1.007 (–3.17) 
2−tROAE  0.007 (1.25)     
3−tEquity  0.049 (1.47) 0.050 (6.72) 0.051 (6.84) 
3−tLiquidity  –2.873 (–2.64) –3.229 (–4.41)   ( ) 3ln −tAssets  –0.218 (–0.46)     
3arg −tinMNI  –0.041 (–0.97)     
3−tNOA  3.486 (0.67)     
3−tOEOI  –0.266 (–0.83)     
3−tROAE  –0.000 (–0.12)     
4−tEquity  –0.007 (–0.33)     
4−tLiquidity  –0.447 (–0.62)     ( ) 4ln −tAssets  0.169 (0.61)     
4arg −tinMNI  0.020 (1.09)     
4−tNOA  –0.944 (–0.48)     
4−tOEOI  –0.028 (–0.34)     
4−tROAE  0.002 (1.00) 0.002 (2.31) 0.002 (2.27) 
2−∆ tLiquidity      3.227 (4.41) 
Limit Points       
λ1 –0.165 (–0.211) –0.467 (–0.695) –0.497 (–0.734) 
λ2 1.672 (2.107) 1.371 (2.032) 1.333 (1.962) 
λ3 3.043 (3.764) 2.727 (3.979) 2.686 (3.889) 
λ4 4.073 (4.937) 3.751 (5.373) 3.710 (5.256) 
λ5 5.341 (6.288) 5.005 (6.936) 4.967 (6.814) 
λ6 6.252 (7.249) 5.905 (8.045) 5.869 (7.926) 
λ7 7.637 (8.607) 7.263 (9.588) 7.227 (9.452) 
Fit Measures       
Pseudo R2  0.370  0.367  0.367  
SBC 2.935  2.637  2.621  
LR statistic 515.964 [0.000] 512.681 [0.000] 512.525 [0.000] 
LR(general→*) NA  6.053 [0.998] 6.239 [0.999] 
Observations 359  360  360  
Table 3 notes: see notes to Table 1.  
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Table 4: Bank ratings ordered probit regressions (1 – 3 lags)  
 
Variables General Parsimonious General Parsimonious General Parsimonious 
Country  1.156 
(12.958) 
1.147 
(12.325) 
1.134 
(12.617) 
1.140 
(12.472) 
1.124 
(12.786) 
1.122 
(14.192) 
1.128 
(14.781) 
1.131 
(15.355) 
1.115 
(16.169) 
time  –0.106 
(–1.958) 
–0.104 
(–2.096) 
–0.105 
(–2.102) 
–0.103 
(–2.071) 
–0.103 
(–2.077) 
–0.083 
(–2.400) 
–0.078 
(–2.315) 
–0.062 
(–2.151) 
–0.064 
(–2.275) 
1−tEquity  0.026 (1.194) 
    0.015 
(1.043) 
0.027 
(4.463) 
0.030 
(5.609) 
0.031 
(6.569) 
1−tLiquidity  –0.206 (–0.269) 
    –0.600 
(–0.955) 
 0.035 
(0.136) 
 
( ) 1ln −tAssets  0.487 (2.955) 0.269 (7.475) 0.268 (7.436) 0.262 (7.283) 0.261 (7.232) 0.249 (1.742) 0.246 (8.834) 0.242 (8.744) 0.234 (8.420) 
1arg −tinMNI  –0.006 (–0.120) 
 
 
 
 
  –0.040 
(–1.051) 
 0.018 
(1.007) 
 
1−tNOA  –0.104 (–0.322) 
    1.345 
(0.530) 
 0.318 
(0.211) 
 
1−tOEOI  –0.205 (–2.925) 
–0.200 
(–3.064) 
–0.208 
(–3.135) 
–0.214 
(–3.206) 
–0.222 
(–3.268) 
–0.138 
(–2.106) 
–0.137 
(–2.342) 
–0.217 
(–3.104) 
–0.219 
(–3.284) 
1−tROAE  0.012 (2.388) 
0.010 
(2.480) 
0.011 
(2.637) 
0.013 
(3.244) 
0.013 
(3.417) 
0.008 
(1.561) 
0.008 
(2.090) 
0.012 
(2.802) 
0.014 
(4.232) 
2−tEquity  –0.012 (–0.525) 
    0.014 
(0.989) 
   
2−tLiquidity  2.674 (2.966) 
2.441 
(3.093) 
 2.444 
(3.109) 
 0.565 
(0.938) 
   
( ) 2ln −tAssets  –0.251 (–0.826)     –0.002 (–0.018)    
2arg −tinMNI  0.010 (0.190) 
    0.072 
(2.388) 
0.042 
(3.181) 
  
2−tNOA  –3.484  (–0.788) 
    –2.490  
(–0.613) 
 
 
  
2−tOEOI  –0.645 (–1.936) 
–0.309 
(–2.917) 
–0.308 
(–2.881) 
–0.472 
(–3.885) 
–0.474 
(–3.821) 
–0.620 
(–2.056) 
–0.517 
(–4.384) 
  
2−tROAE  0.004 (0.966) 
0.005 
(1.860) 
0.005 
(1.878) 
  0.001 
(0.277) 
   
3−tEquity  0.028 (1.989) 
0.034 
(5.147) 
0.035 
(5.247) 
0.033 
(4.875) 
0.034 
(4.970) 
    
3−tLiquidity  –2.208 (–2.992) 
–2.186 
(–3.058) 
 –2.175 
(–3.052) 
     
( ) 3ln −tAssets  0.051 (0.211)         
3arg −tinMNI  0.011 (0.416) 
        
3−tNOA  –1.266 (–0.428) 
        
3−tOEOI  –0.054 (–1.647) 
–0.065 
(–2.632) 
–0.066 
(–2.678) 
–0.083 
(–3.006) 
–0.085 
(–3.097) 
    
3−tROAE  0.004 (2.293) 
0.003 
(2.709) 
0.003 
(2.680) 
0.002 
(2.179) 
0.002 
(2.113) 
    
2−∆ tLiquidity    2.199 (3.088)  2.188 (3.084)     
Limit Points          
λ1 0.064 0.002 –0.053 –0.279 –0.343 –0.220 –0.082 0.356 0.174 
λ2 1.956 1.858 1.787 1.566 1.486 1.457 1.609 1.971 1.782 
λ3 3.322 3.217 3.140 2.921 2.834 2.788 2.932 3.223 3.035 
λ4 4.288 4.185 4.108 3.889 3.802 3.726 3.864 4.127 3.942 
λ5 5.500 5.386 5.314 5.088 5.007 4.810 4.944 5.246 5.061 
λ6 6.438 6.307 6.239 6.007 5.929 5.715 5.843 6.214 6.027 
λ7 7.771 7.629 7.558 7.322 7.241 7.090 7.211 7.541 7.349 
λ8      8.493 8.612 8.728 8.530 
Fit Measures          
Pseudo R2  0.368 0.364 0.364 0.363 0.363 0.349 0.347 0.338 0.337 
SBC 2.893 2.751 2.738 2.741 2.729 2.861 2.775 2.800 2.771 
LR statistic 610.337 
[0.000] 
604.469 
[0.000] 
603.806 
[0.000] 
602.360 
[0.000] 
601.618 
[0.000] 
744.871 
[0.000] 
741.219 
[0.000] 
841.519 
[0.000] 
840.352 
[0.000] 
LR(general→*) NA 5.868 
[0.882] 
6.531 
[0.887] 
7.977 
[0.787] 
8.719 
[0.794] 
NA 3.652 
[0.887] 
NA 1.167 
[0.761] 
Observations 425 425 425 425 425 538 538 629 629 
Table 4 notes: see notes to Table 1.  
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Table 5: Percentage of correct predictions of favoured logit and probit models 
 
 Percentage correct predictions 
   
 Favoured Logit  Favoured Probit 
Rating 4 lags 3 lags 2 lags 1 lag 4 lags 3 lags 2 lags 1 lag 
E 33.33 27.27 25.00 23.08 44.44 27.27 25.00 38.46
D/E 60.00 57.14 57.14 56.52 60.00 60.71 60.32 55.07
D 60.87 64.29 69.70 61.91 60.87 61.91 65.66 62.86
C/D 36.07 31.34 36.25 30.68 34.43 26.87 23.75 22.73
C 68.92 74.39 67.37 71.43 74.32 78.05 73.68 77.31
B/C 28.89 33.33 33.78 41.00 17.78 25.93 24.32 40.00
B 46.34 47.06 71.43 67.68 48.78 54.90 79.76 72.73
A/B 31.25 25.00 25.00 19.36 37.50 25.00 7.14 9.68
A NA NA 0.00 0.00 NA NA 0.00 0.00
Total 50.56 51.29 54.46 52.94 50.83 51.29 52.42 53.42
   
 Logit excluding country 1 Probit excluding country 1 
Rating 4 lags 3 lags 2 lags 1 lag 4 lags 3 lags 2 lags 1 lag 
E 11.11 9.09 8.33 7.69 11.11 9.09 8.33 7.69
D/E 35.56 39.29 38.10 30.44 35.56 37.50 30.16 28.99
D 44.93 52.38 58.59 51.43 47.83 54.76 59.60 51.43
C/D 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
C 72.97 65.85 44.21 54.62 74.32 65.85 35.79 52.94
B/C 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
B 36.59 35.29 39.29 37.37 19.51 35.29 39.29 38.38
A/B 6.25 5.00 7.14 3.23 25.00 10.00 7.14 3.23
A NA NA 0.00 0.00 NA NA 0.00 0.00
Total 32.78 32.94 29.74 28.46 32.50 33.41 27.51 28.14
   
 Logit excluding country 2 Probit excluding country 2 
Rating 4 lags 3 lags 2 lags 1 lag 4 lags 3 lags 2 lags 1 lag 
E 11.11 9.09 8.33 7.69 11.11 9.09 8.33 7.69
D/E 22.22 35.09 30.16 27.54 24.44 33.33 30.16 23.19
D 52.17 53.57 55.56 49.52 53.62 52.38 54.55 47.62
C/D 20.97 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
C 70.27 70.73 57.90 58.82 75.68 71.95 54.74 60.50
B/C 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
B 41.46 37.26 53.57 45.46 36.59 31.37 55.95 45.46
A/B 18.75 5.00 3.57 3.23 18.75 15.00 3.57 3.23
A NA NA 0.00 0.00 NA NA 0.00 0.00
Total 36.57 33.80 32.71 30.84 34.07 33.33 32.34 29.41
The favoured logit (probit) models are those reported in Tables 1 and 2 (Tables 3 and 4) whereas these 
models with the country variable removed (called logit/probit excluding country 1) are reported in Table 
6. Models developed using the general-to-specific method where the country variable is excluded from 
the general model (called logit/probit excluding country 2) are given in Table 7  The percentage of correct 
predictions are the percentage of times that a particular observed rating (say A) is correctly predicted by 
the model.  
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Table 6: Bank ratings favoured models with country effects excluded 
 
 Logit models Probit models 
Variables 4 lags 3 lags 2 lags 1 lag 4 lags 3 lags 2 lags 1 lag 
Country          
time  –0.253 
(–2.484) 
–0.325 
(–4.162) 
–0.347 
(–5.845) 
–0.266 
(–6.285) 
–0.148 
(–2.493) 
–0.179 
(–4.033) 
–0.198 
(–6.208) 
–0.152 
(–5.962) 
1−tEquity    0.073 (4.743) 
0.060 
(3.210) 
  0.038 
(5.039) 
0.032 
(4.531) 
1−tLiquidity          ( ) 1ln −tAssets  0.636 (8.167) 0.613 (9.129) 0.487 (8.004) 0.521 (9.372) 0.318 (7.479) 0.311 (8.302) 0.250 (8.074) 0.264 (9.387) 
1arg −tinMNI          
1−tNOA          
1−tOEOI  –0.778 (–2.578) 
–0.708 
(–2.029) 
–0.637 
(–2.409) 
–0.828 
(–1.115) 
–0.436 
(–3.241) 
–0.373 
(–3.180) 
–0.321 
(–2.755) 
–0.354 
(–2.780) 
1−tROAE  0.025 (2.901) 
0.016 
(1.982) 
0.017 
(1.972) 
0.009 
(0.657) 
0.015 
(3.275) 
0.010 
(2.327) 
0.010 
(2.191) 
0.008 
(2.265) 
2−tEquity          
2−tLiquidity          ( ) 2ln −tAssets          
2arg −tinMNI    –0.101 (–3.014) 
   –0.054 
(–3.374) 
 
2−tNOA  –25.071  (–2.962) 
   –12.910  
(–3.422) 
   
2−tOEOI  –2.454 (–3.665) 
–0.823 
(–2.739) 
–0.866 
(–1.887) 
 –1.275 
(–3.829) 
–0.482 
(–3.222) 
–0.523 
(–2.602) 
 
2−tROAE          
3−tEquity  0.102 (4.767) 
0.076 
(4.194) 
  0.054 
(6.160) 
0.039 
(4.812) 
  
3−tLiquidity          ( ) 3ln −tAssets          
3arg −tinMNI          
3−tNOA          
3−tOEOI   –0.214 (–4.309) 
   –0.121 
(–4.102) 
  
3−tROAE   –0.001 (–0.648) 
   –0.0002 
(–0.239) 
  
4−tROAE  0.003 (2.005) 
 
 
  0.002 
(2.163) 
 
 
  
2−∆ tLiquidity  4.710 (4.250) 4.170 (3.445)   2.832 (4.343) 2.339 (3.115)   
Fit Measures         
Pseudo R2  0.115 0.107 0.097 0.073 0.103 0.096 0.089 0.066 
SBC 3.696 3.711 3.757 3.809 3.742 3.755 3.787 3.835 
LR statistic 160.747 
[0.000] 
178.233 
[0.000] 
206.611 
[0.000] 
181.157 
[0.000] 
144.224 
[0.000] 
159.302 
[0.000] 
190.033 
[0.000] 
164.703 
[0.000] 
Observations 360 425 538 629 360 425 538 629 
Table 6 notes: see notes to Table 1. These are the favoured (highlighted in bold) 
parsimonious regressions reported in Tables 1 – 4 with the Country variable excluded.  
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Table 7: Bank ratings best fitting models with country effects excluded 
 
 Logit models Probit models 
Variables 4 lags 3 lags 2 lags 1 lag 4 lags 3 lags 2 lags 1 lag 
Country          
time   –0.282 
(–3.558) 
–0.334 
(–5.955) 
–0.288 
(–6.871) 
 –0.149 
(–3.235) 
–0.191 
(–6.235) 
–0.160 
(–6.145) 
1−tEquity  0.131 
(8.274) 
0.060 
(2.390) 
 0.083 
(6.794) 
0.067 
(6.227) 
0.032 
(2.499) 
 0.044 
(7.177) 
1−tLiquidity    –3.922 
(–7.556) 
–3.672 
(–7.497) 
  –2.067 
(–6.962) 
–1.860 
(–6.429) ( ) 1ln −tAssets  0.592 
(7.070) 
0.562 
(7.190) 
0.476 
(7.808) 
0.444 
(7.750) 
0.286 
(6.241) 
0.278 
(6.701) 
0.244 
(7.369) 
0.223 
(7.480) 
1arg −tinMNI   –0.122 
(–3.837) 
–0.132 
(–4.243) 
–0.178 
(–6.763) 
 –0.076 
(–4.598) 
–0.075 
(–4.598) 
–0.103 
(–7.423) 
1−tNOA   12.652 
(1.938) 
20.285 
(3.153) 
  6.967 
(2.396) 
10.677 
(3.847) 
 
1−tOEOI  –0.824 
(–5.069) 
–0.775 
(–2.676) 
–0.635 
(–2.310) 
–0.892 
(–4.657) 
–0.444 
(–4.725) 
–0.429 
(–3.519) 
–0.338 
(–2.907) 
–0.452 
(–4.392) 
1−tROAE  0.025 
(2.612) 
0.033 
(3.146) 
0.025 
(2.494) 
0.032 
(4.740) 
0.014 
(2.885) 
0.019 
(3.692) 
0.014 
(2.830) 
0.017 
(4.608) 
2−tEquity    0.070 
(4.752) 
   0.039 
(5.581) 
 
2−tLiquidity          ( ) 2ln −tAssets          
2arg −tinMNI          
2−tNOA   –25.577 
(–2.634) 
–30.415 
(–2.965) 
  –14.101 
(–3.157) 
–16.097 
(–3.475) 
 
2−tOEOI  –1.471 
(–4.094) 
–2.232 
(–3.187) 
–2.476 
(–3.498) 
 –0.805 
(–3.869) 
–1.229 
(–3.914) 
–1.351 
(–4.288) 
 
2−tROAE          
3−tEquity   0.045 
(1.836) 
   0.024 
(2.120) 
  
3−tLiquidity  –3.619 
(–6.256) 
–2.990 
(–5.990) 
  –1.920 
(–6.019) 
–1.671 
(–5.967) 
  
( ) 3ln −tAssets          
3arg −tinMNI  –0.140 
(–5.394) 
   –0.083 
(–6.125) 
   
3−tNOA          
3−tOEOI  –1.463 
(–5.885) 
–0.176 
(–3.178) 
  –0.779 
(–5.434) 
–0.099 
(–3.131) 
  
3−tROAE  –0.006 
(–4.188) 
   –0.003 
(–3.616) 
   
4−tNOA  6.590 
(2.103) 
   3.684 
(2.082) 
   
4−tROAE          
Fit Measures         
Pseudo R2  0.156 0.151 0.141 0.121 0.140 0.137 0.129 0.109 
SBC 3.553 3.585 3.617 3.634 3.613 3.637 3.665 3.685 
LR statistic 218.064 
[0.000] 
250.440 
[0.000] 
300.759 
[0.000] 
303.978 
[0.000] 
196.581 
[0.000] 
228.325 
[0.000] 
274.866 
[0.000] 
272.179 
[0.000] 
Observations 361 426 538 629 361 426 538 629 
Table 7 notes: see notes to Table 1. These models were developed without the country 
variable included in the general model, following the general-to-specific method, so as 
to best fit the data.   
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Figure 1: Percentage of ratings through time 
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